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INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM COMMUNIST ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID TO SYRIA

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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030111-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030111-4 SECRET CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Directorate of Intelligence July 1972 INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM COMMUNIST ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID TO SYRIA Summary and Conclusions 1. Despite shifting Syrian domestic politics and periodic Syrian-Soviet difficulties, Communist economic and military aid has continued. Since early 1955, Syria has been extended more than $675 million of military aid and almost $485 million of economic aid. Damascus is currently the fourth largest Third World recipient of Communist arms, and the Communist countries (mainly the Soviet Union) are practically the sole source of military equipment and training. Marshal Grechko's May visit to Damascus, which probably ended in the signing of an arms agreement,' suggests that substantial Soviet arms shipments will continue. 2. The Communist countries also are the chief source of foreign capital for Syria's economic development. During 1966-70, their share of Syria's total public investment was about 17%. Large sums were spent on agriculture, industry, and transportation. Communist aid may represent an even larger share of the present development plan because the Euphrates River project has been accelerated, and Western capital continues to be reluctant to move into Syria. It is also likely that the level of Communist aid will increase. Magnitude of Military Assistance 3. Military aid was Moscow's first vehicle for establishing its influence in Syria; significant economic aid was not extended until the military aid program had become well entrenched. From early 1956 to date, Note: This memorandum was prepaied by the Office of Economic Research and coordinated within the Directorate of Irncelligenec. SECRET Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030111-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030111-4 SECRET Communist arms aid commitments have totaled more than $675 million (see Table I below, and Table 6 in the Appendix). Moscow accounts for more than 85% of this amount. Only Egypt, India, and Iraq now rank larger as Third World Communist arms recipients.() I More than $645 million had been delivered by the end of 1971, about 45% since the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War. Syria has signed several small military agreements with Western countries,(2) but, for all practical purposes, it is completely dependent on Soviet arms. Communist Military Aid Extended to Syria Total 1956-71 1967-71 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 USSR 582 255 100 75 - 40 40 Czecho-slovakia 82a 37 10 - 12 15 - Poland 10 10 - - - 10 - China 2 2 - - 2 - - East Ger- many Negl. Negl. Negl. - - - - a. Excluding a $2 million downpayment in 1956. Early Agreements, 1956-66 4. Syria's first Communist arms accord was a $37 million agreement with Czechoslovakia signed early in 1956. As with Egypt a year earlier, Prague acted as Moscow's agent, shipping Soviet-made arms from Czechoslovakia. In late 1956, Syria concluded a $42 million agreement directly with the USSR and signed a $75 million accord in 1957. After 1. Indonesia also has received more arms than Syria, but that program has been dormant since 1965. 2. Agreements signed in 1968-69 include $9 million with West Germany (for vehicles and .;ommunications equipment); $1 million with Spain (for truck-mounted recoilless rifles and ammunition); and $t million with Italy (for land mines). SECRET Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030111-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030111-4 SECRET Egypt "I'd Syria formed the United Arab Republic (UAR) in February 1958, Cairo assumed control of Communist arms procurement for both regions. When the union broke up in September 1961, Moscow halted shipments to Syria but negotiated a $60 million agreement with Damascus early the next year. 5. By June 1967 the USSR had extended more than $325 million of military aid to Syria under six separate agreements and had delivered at least 124 MIG jet fighters, nine SU-7 jet fighter bombers, six IL-28 light jet bombers, 550 medium tanks, 90 self-propelled assault guns, and 550 armored personnel carriers(3) (see the photographs, Figures 1 and 2). The Y5~ ;+ r'e'f Soviet-built Syrian tank captured by Israel in the June 1967 war Figure 2. Syrian-manned Soviet-built SU-100 asse'jlt gun 3. Fox a list of major equipment delivered to Syria see Table 7, in the Appendix. SECRET Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030111-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030111-4 SECRET SA-2 surface-to-air missile system listed under a 1965 accord was not provided until early in 1969. Soviet naval vessels delivered included six Komar-class guided missile patrol boats, two T-43 minesweepers, and 16 P-4 class motor torpedo boats. These vessels still constitute most of Syria's naval inventory. Agreements Since the June 1967 War 6. From mid-1967 through 1971, Syria signed military aid agreements with the USSR totaling about $255 million.(4) An August 1967 accord for $100 million included replacements for Syria's substantial equipment losses during the June 1967 War. Damascus lost nearly two-thirds of its combat aircraft and a large part of its land armaments, but large-scale Soviet deliveries in the second half of 1967 replaced most of these losses. 7. Procurement since 1968 has

been directed tow.:rd expanding and modernizing Syria's armed forces, particularly its air defense system. In 1969 the SA-2 missile system was introduced. A $40 million agreement concluded in February 1971 provides for the delivery of ZSU-23-4 radar controlled antiaircraft guns and the SA-3 system, in addition to MIG-21 jet fighters, MI-8 helicopters, and various ground forces weaponry. By the end of 1971, Syria had received 179 MIG jet fighters, more than 25 SU-7 fighter bombers, 22 MI-8 helicopters, about 575 tanks, 150 armored personnel carriers, and 785 artillery pieces. (For examples of this equipment, see the photographs, Figures 3-6.) Soviet military deliveries reached a peak of $100 million in 1971 (see Table 2). Estimated Communist Military Aid Deliveries to Syria Million Ilion' US $ 1956-71 1967-71 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 USSR 573 268 48 35 35 50 100 Eastern Europe 71 26 2 3 2 10 9 China 2 2 - - - 1 1 4. Another agreement probably was signed in May 1972, but details are not known. 4 SECRET Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030111-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030111-4 SECRET Figure 3. ZSU-23-4 self-propelled antiaircraft gun Figure 4. Syrian air force MIG-17 jet that landed in Israel in August 1968 Figure S. Soviet MIG-21 jet fighter SECRET Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030111-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030111-4 SECRET Figure 6. Soviet SU-7 fighter bomber 8. Since mid-1967, East European countries nave concluded five military aid agreements with Syria totaling nearly $50 million. Czechoslovakia, which extended $37 million, has delivered more than 100 T-54 tanks and 20 L-29 MAYA training aircraft. Poland agreed to provide $10 million for tanks in 1970 and East Germany provided token assistance. Terms of Repayment 9. Moscow sells Damascus arms at low prices and on favorable terms. Discounts from list prices average about 45% for most weapons systems. Repayment varies from five to ten years at 2% interest and generally is made in Syrian commodities. By the end of 1971, Damascus had repaid some $65 million on its arms debt to the USSR, about 20% of the amount owed. Repayments reached an estimated high of $13 million in 1965, but an agreement that year rescheduled the remaining debt over 15 years. In 1968 the USSR agreed to a moratorium on principal payments during 1969-72; interest payments averaging $3 million a year, however, are continuing. Military Technical Assistance 10. Under the military technical assistance program, Syrian personnel are trained in Communist countries. By the end of 1971, more than 1,500 Syrians had received such training, about 1,150 in the USSR. 11. The number of Communist (mainly Soviet) military technicians in Syria has varied with the flow of arms. These technicians generally deliver, assemble, and maintain military equipment; train Syrian personnel in tactics and in the operation and maintenance of equipment; and serve as advisers to staff and line military officers. Their numbers, which varied between SECRET Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030111-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030111-4 SECRET 100 and 400 until 1967, jumped to an estimated 1,100 after the June 1967 War. By 1971, about 800 military technicians, all Soviet, still were employed in Syria. The cost - estimated at nearly $6 million in 1971 - represents a current account outlay since Moscow rarely provides credit for such purposes. Amount and Character of Communist Economic Aid 12. Communist countries have extended Syria nearly $485 million of economic assistance since early in 1955 (see Table 3), making them the largest source of foreign capital for Syrian economic development. The Soviet Union has committed nearly $235 million, Eastern Europe some $190 million, and Chiiia about $60 million. 13. Czechoslovakia and East Germany extended the first Communist aid, a number of credits for small industrial plants, in 1955-56. The first large credit, however, was some $170 million from the USSR in 1957 for various development projects. This was later reduced to $100 million when Moscow decided in 1960 not to undertake the Euphrates Dam. In 1966 the Soviets again reversed themselves and extended a $133 million credit for the dam's construction. 14. Nearly all Communist economic aid has been for project construction. About 30% has been channeled into major power and irrigation projects. An estimated 20% has gone for industrial development (exclusive of the petroleum industry), 15% for petroleum and phosphate development, and 15% for transportation and communications facilities.(5) The Euphrates River Project 15. The largest Communist-aided power and irrigation undertaking (about $140 million extended) is the Euphrates River project (see the photograph, Figure 7). The World Bark surveyed this project in 1955, but Moscow was the first to provide aid. (For Soviet-assisted projects, see the map.) An estimated $70 million was included for construction in the 1957 credit. After completing a $1.3 million survey, however, Moscow withdrew. While the Soviets never disclosed their reasons, the inability of riparian countries - Syria, Iraq, and Turkey - to settle the water distribution question probably was a major factor. 16. In June 1961, Syria concluded a $120 million agreement with West Germany for construction of the project. Bonn, however, reconsidered the scope of its aid, after the dissolution of the Egyptian-Syrian union later that year, and reduced the credit to less than $90 million. The West Germans 5. For a list of Communist-aided projects in Syria, see Table 8. SECRET 7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030111-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030111-4 Communist Economic Aid Extended to Syria Million US $ 1955-72 1955-60 1961-65 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 197 a 1 1972 Total 483.9 125.2 47.6 216.8 0 25.0 25.0 N.A. 0.3 44.0 USSR 233.6 100.0 0 133.3 0 0 N A N A . . . . 0.3 0 Eastern Cn Europe 190.0 25.2 31.3 83.5 0 25 0 25 0 0 . . 0 0 Bulgaria Czecho- 15.0 15.0 slovakia East Ger- 57.2 22.5 5.2 29.5 many 53.8 25.0 Hungary 14.0 14.0 Poiaiid 25.0 Romania 25 n 25.0 China 60.3 0 16.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 44.0 a. January-June. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030111-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030111-4 SECRET Figure '1. Euphrates Dam under construction by the Soviets Major Soviet Assisted Projects in Syria I~taNl(t(~ Fm' lry Rescafr r Cenlit BlnlyI, VGLfTF.kRANkAN ' SRA TuID'S ,Ar. Ra Q Gap.... _ ..._.. SYRIA International boundary O Notlonol Capital Railroad Road SECRET Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030111-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030111-4 SECRET continued to drag their feet, largely because of doubts over Syria's ability to finance its share of the cost and to repay the credits. After more than five years of such frustration, Damascus again turned to Moscow. 17. In addition to a dam about 200 feet high and 1.5 miles long at Tabaqah, the project includes a 300,000-kilowatt powerplant, irrigation facilities for some 575,000 acres, electric power transmission lines, auxiliary railroads, a small city, and a technical training center. Moscow's credit will cover about half the estimated $260 million cost, presumably the foreign exchange portion. An estimated 12,000 personnel, including about 1,000 Soviet techr_icians, currently are employed on the project, which is scheduled for completion in 1975. Petroleum Development 18. About $60 million have been channeled into Syria's oil industry. Moscow committed about $18 million in 1957 for exploration, and later helped develop three oilfields in As Suwayda, Qarah Shuk, and Rumaylay. Crude oil production from these fields totaled 5.5 million metric tons in 1971 and is expected to reach 12 million tons by 1975, yielding an estimated annual gross income of nearly $80 million. Moscow signed additional contracts early in 1971 for a seismic survey and development of the Al Jebissa oilfield and probably will construct a pipeline and associated storage facilities from the oilfields to the port of Tartus. Czechoslovakia extended more than $40 million to construct and subsequently expanded the Hims oil refinery. The plant, with an annual capacity of 2.7 million tons, now meets most of Syria's requirements. Phosphate Development 19. Bulgaria, Poland, and Romania are providing at least $10 million to develop Syria's phosphate industry. Three extraction plants are expected to produce over 1.2 million tons of low-grade phosphates annually. A Romanian-built plant with an annual capacity of 300,000 tons already is in operation. Nearly all the production of these plants will be e,-:ported to Eastern Europe, mainiy as aid repayment. Estimated income from phosphate exports is expected to reach some $6 million annually. Railroad Construction 20. The 1957 Soviet agreement included some $40 million to construct a 420-mile railroad linking Al Qamishli in the northeast with the port of Latakia, including a trunk line south to Aims-'Akkari. Work on the project was not begun until early in the 1960s and apparently still has not been completed. The USSR also is building a line connecting Tartus and Tudmur, the location of large phosphate deposits, and is providing 10 SECRET Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030111-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030111-4 SECRET locomotives and railway cars valued at some $12 million. Financing arrzngements for the rolling stock are not known but they probably are under long-term credits. Drawings 21. By the end of 1971, more than $260 million of Communist economic assistance had been drawn. An estimated $170 million have been drawn on Soviet aid and more than $55 million on Czechoslovak aid. Drawings rose slowly during the early years of the program. They averaged about $11 million annually during 1961-65, continued to rise slowly the next two years, and surged to nearly $40 million annually during 1968-70 because of sizable deliveries for the Euphrates project. Economic Aid Reps; nents 22. Soviet credits to Syria are repayable in local goods over 12 years at 2.5% interest. East European terms vary from seven to 12 years at 2.5 interest largely in coma aodities; most require downpayments, with a few as high as 30%. By the end of 1971, Syria had paid an estimated $18 million on its Soviet economic debt and some $8 million on its East European debt, practically all in agricultural commodities. 23. Although Syria's total foreign debt service ratio was a low 6% in 1970, its poor financial position compelled Damascus to

ask Moscow for a rescheduling. Moscow deferred the 1970 principal payment and in the following year postponed 1971-75 principal payments until 1984-86. Annual interest payments, however, continue to be made on schedule. East European debts have not been rescheduled. Economic Aid Financing for Syria's Develo rnent Plan 24. Communist aid deliveries represented about 17% of public sector investments during the 1966-70 development plan and Western sources about 3%. Syria's reliance on foreign financing, however, is expected to increase during the curreh;t development plan. The Third Five-Year Plan (1971-75) calls for $1.5 billion of public investment. About $420 million are earmarked for major irrigation projects, inclu: mg completion of the Euphrates Dam and $170 million for petroleum development. Estimated capital requirements have increased substantially, but the growth of domestic revenues has slowed while military-related expenditures have remained high. Thus, foreign capital inflow probably will have to exceed the current projections of $75 million annually if a substantial part of the plan is to be implemented. The Communist countries are likely to continue as a source 'of large-scale aid. SECRET 11 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030111-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030111-4 SECRET Non-Communist Economic Aid 25. During 1959-71, Syria received about $75 million from non-Communist sources. In the past two years, however, there have been indications of Syrian interest in developing a greater inflow of Western official and private capital. In recent years, Syria has accepted $38 million in Kuwaiti aid, including a $28 million grant in 1972. Late in 1971, Syria applied to the International Development Association for a $12 million credit for highway construction - only its second request for a credit from a multilateral lending agency. Syrian officials ostensibly are encouraging foreign private investment and are studying French offers to invest in food processing and plastics plants worth more than $40 million. Technical Assistance 26. Communist technical assistance has increased steadily since the early 1960s. The number of economic technicians employed in Syria reached more than 1,100 in 1971 (see Table 4), most of them Soviet personnel working on the Euphrates project. The salaries and expenses of these technicians - estimated at about $8 -million in 1971 - are covered by Soviet credits. The number of Soviet personnel has increased during the first few months of 1972 and some 1,300 are expected to be employed during the year. The number of East European technicians has ranged between 150 and 200 annually since 1966. There were an estimated 60 Chinese technicians working on a textile mill in 1971. Communist Economic Technicians in Syria Year Total USSR Eastern Europe China 1966 515 350 150 15 1967 760 545 200 15 1968 860 650 200 10 1969 860 650 150 60 197J 1,000 780 160 60 1971 1,130 910 160 60 27. Nearly 3,700 Syrian students and technicians have received training in Communist countries since 1956 (see Table 5), about 50% since 12 SECRET Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030111-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030111-4 SECRET Estimated Number of Students and Technical Trainees from Syria Trained in Communist Countries Academic Students Technical Trainees Eastern Eastern Year Total USSR Europe Total USSR Europe Departures 1956-71 2,885 1,300 1,585 790 245 545 Being trained? 1966 400 250 150 - - - i967 285 210 75 25 25 - 1968 235 210 25 60 35 25 1969 805 510 295 320 75 245 1970 1,290 625 665 30 30 - 1971 1,435 770 665 100 50 50 a. As of December of the stated year. 1968. Some 58% have trained in East European counu?es and the rest in the USSR. Impact of Communist Aid on Syria's Trade 28. As the Communist aid program has expanded, Syrian trade with the donor countries also has grown. Communist trade rose from about $5 million in 1954 to a peak of $200 million in 1969 and since 1965 has accounted for about one-third of Syria's total trade (see Table 9, in the Appendix). Deliveries of economic aid during the 1960s accounted for about 30% of Syrian imports from Communist countries, while repayments of economic and military aid accounted for nearly 25% of Syrian exports. The latter would have been much higher in recent years if the USSR had not rescheu;?.:le! Syria's debts. 29. Syrian imports from Communist countries (nearly 35% of total Syrian imports since the mid-1960s) have consisted largely of machinery and equipment, petroleum products, transportation equipment, ferrous SECRET 13 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030111-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030111-4 SECRET metals, and various other ,n;;nufactured goods. Exports to these countries (more than 30% of total Syrian exports) have been overwhelmingly agricultural products, principally cotton, and wool. Phosphates, and possibly oil, are likely to become, important exports to Communist countries in the neat few years. 14 SECRET Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030111-4 F, 111111i", Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030111-4 SECRET Statistical Tables SECRET 15 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030111-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030111-4 SECRET Communist Military Aid Agreements with Syria Million US $ Estimated Date of Communist Value of Agreement Signatory Agreement Credits Discount ist half 1956 Czechoslovakia 35a 35 - Nov 1956 USSR 42 14 28 Oct 1957 USSR 75 25 50 Feb 1958 USSR 90 60 30 Mar 1962 USSR 60 30 30 Oct 1963 Czechoslovakia 5 5 - Oct 1964 USSR 35 18 17 Mar 1965 Czechoslovakia 5 5 - Apr 1966 USSR 25 .13 12 Jul 1967 East Germany Negl. - - Aug 1967 USSR 100 50 50 Oct 1967 Czechoslovakia 10 10 - Aug 1968 USSR 75 45 30 May 1969 China 2 2 - Aug 1969 Czechoslovakia 12 12 - Apr 1970 Czechoslovakia 15 15 - 2nd half 1970 Poland 10 10 - 2nd half 1970 USSR 40 30 10 Feb 19 71 USSR 40 30 10 Total 676 409 267 a. The total agreement was for $37 million; a $2 million downpayment was required. 16 SECRET Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030111-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030111-4 SECRET Major Communist Military Equipment Delivered to Syria 1956-71 Equipment Land armaments Tanks Armored personnel carriers Artillery' Self-propelled guns Naval ships 1,233 700 1,750 150 Minesweepers 2 Motor torpedo boats 16 Guided missile boats 6 Light jet bombers Jet fighters Helicopters Other Guided missile systems Surface-to-surface, antitankb Surface-to-air Air-to-aird 6 340 38 145 34 10 138 a. Including recoilless rifles, rocket launchers, and mortars over 100-mm in size. b. Indicating the number of vehicles used as launchers (three missiles per vehicle). c. Indicating the number of SAM firing battalions (sites) -- (six launchers per SA-2 site). d. Indicating the number of fighter aircraft equipped with AAM (two to four per aircraft). SECRET 17 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030111-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030111-4 Communist Economic Assistance to Syria, by Project Donor Date Extended Projects Amount Extended (Million US $) Statusa Bulgaria Jun 1966 Line of credit: Agricultural projects Wine distillery Phosphate industry development Tobacco processing- machinery Refrigerated warehousing Communications project UC C 1955 2 cement plants 4.5 C 1955 Sugar refinery, Damascus 1.3 C 1955 China factory 0.2 C Dec 1956 Sugar refinery, Rims 1.3 C Mar 1957 Petroleum refinery, Hims 11.3 C Dec 1960 Municipal development: 46 electric generators ($0.4 million) 2.8 C Jun 1964 Sugar refinery, Al Ghab 5.2 C Dec 1966 Expansion of petroleum refinery, Hims 29.5 C Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030111-4 . Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030111-4 Communist Economic Assistance to Syria, by Project (continued) Date Extended P Amount Extended rojects (Million US $) East Germany Sep 1955 Weaving mill 0.1 C Jul 1956 Cement plant, Aleppo 1.9 C Sep 1956 Textile mill 0.4 C C!) t17 1957 1957 Shoe factory, Hims Hospital equipment 0.2 0.1 C C Cl) C) 1965 Equipment for Euphrates River 1 1 C - t17 Apr 1966 Line of credit: . 25 0 C) 1 . Foundry Port equipment Water purification and storage equipment ($0.6 million) Cement plant equipment Power transmission equipment Paper mill equipment Tj H 5 automatic flour mills Highway construction equip-ment ($3.6 million) Aid to higher education ($5.5 million) Tobacco plant Prefab housing plant Credit added to 1966 credit UC UC UC Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030111-4 F~~~~FSa!itized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030111-4 Communist Economic Assistance to Syria, by Project (continued) Hungary Date Extended Aug 1966 Projects _Lin- of credit: Telephone network ($1.0 million) May 1972 May 1963 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030111-4 Line of credit: Slaughter house, Aleppo ($0.8 million) Phosphate exploitation ($4.8 million) Steel rolling mill, Hamah ($5.0 million) Spinning mill, Aleppo Iron ore exploration Glassware plant Telephone assembly plant Line of credit: Commodities ($8.1 million) Cotton textile mill, Harrah ($3.6 million) Yarn spinning mill Line of credit: Amount Extended (M,ilion US $) Staius C UC Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030111-4 Communist Economic Assistance to Syria, by Project (continued) Donor Date Extended Roma is Jun 1968 USSR Oct 1957 Credit - machinery and equip- ment Oil pumps ($0.3 million) 2 phosphate plants, Khunayfis ($1.3 million) Euphrates Valley surveys ($1.3 million) Orontes River and Al Ghab Valley development Other agricultural surveys ($3.6 million) Latakia-Qamishii railroad projects ($40.0 million) Nitrate fertilizer factory, Hims ($13.5 million) Petroleum exploration and geological surveys ($17.8 million) Pipeline design Forestry research center, Latakia Dry farming research center Amount Extended (Million US $) Status UC C C UC tTl n 71 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030111-4 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030111-4 Communist Economic Assistance to Syria, by Project (continued) Donor Date Extended Projects USSR (cont'd) Cotton research center, Ar Raqqah

Rastan electric power station ($1.2 million) Topographical survey ($0.5 million) Geological studies ($1.0 million) Bridge studies Concrete reinforcing rod plant Petroleum products storage Dec 1966 Euphrates Dam, Tabaqah . Jul 1969 Credit - irrigation projects b 1970 Credit - telecommunications equipment b UC Feb 1971 Grant - experimental farm 0.3c UC a. Symbols used in status column have the following meanings: C - completed; UC - under construction. b. The amount extended is not known. c. Minimum estimated value. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030111-4 Amount Extended (Million US $) Status 133 3 UC Sanitized Copy Approved for Release Table 9 Syrian Trade with Communist Countries Million US $ Estimated Economic Aid Drawin s Estimated Economic and Military g Aid Repayments Total Total Imports from Exports to Percent of Communist Percent of Communi t Year World Trade Communist Trade Communist Countries Communist C t i Million Exports Million s Imports cn .- oun r es US $ to Syria us $ from Syria n 1960 359 41 19 22 5 23 1961 309 47 19 28 9 47 6 21 1962 1 402 71 31 40 11 35 7 18 963 424 94 32 62 12 38 11 18 1964 411 113 41 72 1 27 16 22 1965 381 97 38 59 14 37 1.8 31 1966 462 148 87 61 20 23 16 26 1967 419 140 94 46 22 23 12 26 1968 489 163 120 43 40 33 14 33 1969 576 201 126 75 32 25 10 13 1970 563 171 114 57 44 39 14 25 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030111-4

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